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Conscious and Non-Conscious Representation in Social Representations Theory: Social Representations from the Phenomenological Point of View

University of Cambridge, UK, pd285{at}cam.ac.uk

Verheggen and Baerveldt’s (2007) recent paper critiques the concept of ‘sharedness’ in Social Representations Theory (SRT). However, these arguments against sharedness are themselves founded upon an implicit argument against the role of ‘representation’ in SRT. This constitutes what I call the phenomenological critique of SRT. From a discussion of Heidegger’s phenomenology one can better understand Verheggen and Baerveldt’s argument. By concentrating on anchoring and objectification, the notion of ‘representation’ can be conceived as both a ‘conscious’ and a ‘non-conscious’ account of meaning. A Heideggerian phenomenological approach can unify the conscious and non-conscious elements of SRT into a common framework. Such phenomenological appreciation of SRT can contribute to a theory of meaning for cultural psychology.

Key Words: cultural psychology • enactivism • Heidegger • implicit meaning • phenomenology • practical knowledge • Social Representations Theory

Culture & Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 3, 372-385 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1354067X09343704


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